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Abstract—This paper demonstrates a comprehensive analysis 
method using formal methods such as finite-state machine. First, 
we describe the modified version of our new protocol and briefly 
explain the encrypt-then-authenticate mechanism, which is 
regarded as more a secure mechanism than the one used in our 
protocol. Then, we use a finite-state verification to study the 
behaviour of each machine created for each phase of the protocol 
and examine their behaviours together. Modelling with finite-
state machines shows that the modified protocol can function 
correctly and behave properly even with invalid input or time 
delay. 
Keywords—identity-based cryptosystem; cryptographic 
protocols; finite-state machine 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Security protocols are becoming the core subject in 
communication systems and verifying them has gained 
significant attention by researchers and developers. Security 
analysis aims to formally guarantee these protocols to satisfy 
their specifications and they can function soundly. Security 
evaluation is a fundamental step in the development of 
security protocols. The methods used to analyse security 
protocols can be categorised into two groups: methods based 
on analytical approach and methods based on simulation. The 
analytical approach offers accurate results and provides a clear 
perception of the system characteristics. However, this 
approach becomes unreliable when dealing with high complex 
system. Therefore, the latter approach, simulation approach, 
has become more popular in system analysis. Simulation tools, 
such as finite-state machines and Petri nets, expose progress in 
two directions: one related to the development of faster 
methods during execution of mathematical algorithms [1], and 
the other associated with the effectiveness simulation 
presentations and results [2]. 
Protocol modelling is a crucial step in designing security 
protocols. It contributes to diminishing ambiguity and 
misinterpretation of protocol specifications.  For example, 
modelling a protocol using finite-state machine can help to 
understand how it will interact with the changes and how it 
will behave with invalid inputs. A Finite-State Machine 
(FSM) is a powerful tool to simulate software architecture and 
communication protocols. FSM can only model the control 
part of a system and consists of a finite number of states, a 
finite number of events, and a finite number of transitions. 
Modelling with finite-state machine helps to understand 
the behaviour of complex protocol. Also, it offers accurate 
results and provides a clear perception of the system 
characteristics. The analysis presented in this paper covers the 
process of the three-way handshake used to negate the session 
key and examine the behaviours of the protocol and 
enumerates all possible states it can reach. 
The structure of this paper is organised as follows. In 
Section 2, we briefly review previous works on extended 
finite-state machine and briefly discuss the weakness in our 
new protocol and present modified version of it. In Section 3, 
we model the modified protocol using EFSM. We then 
provide a brief discussion on security analysis in Section 4. 
Finally, the conclusions are given in Section 5. 
II. REVIEW OF RELATED WORK 
A. Extended Finite-State Machines 
In order to model the complex behaviour of the proposed 
protocol, an extended model of FSM is considered. According 
to [3], EFSM helps to comprehend the state space complexity 
of a system when the number of states and transitions 
increases Also, they emphasise the importance of introducing 
state variables in FSM models. State variable play a key role 
in modelling because they can “define a range of arithmetic 
and logical operators to manipulate state variables and trigger 
transitions based on logical primitives” [3]. Moreover, EFSM 
with variables can transfer variable values from one model to 
another. Consequently, the produced output value from one 
machine can be consumed by other machines. With the 
introduction of variables, EFSM allows one to model a system 
with conditions. Transitions may have guards and predicates, 
which consist of operations or Boolean-valued expressions 
that can depend on input variables [3]. 
A formal definition of an EFSM is as follows [3, 4]: 
An Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM) M is a tuple (S, T, E, V) where, 
S is a set of states,  
T is a set of transitions,  
E is a set of events, and  
V is a store represented by a set of variables.  
Transitions have a source state source(t) ∈ S, a target state target(t) ∈ S and a 
label lbl(t). Transition labels are of the form e1[c]/a where e1 ∈ E, c is a 
condition and a is a sequence of actions.  
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Fig. 1. The modified proposed protocol 
B. Review of Proposed Protocol 
In our previous work [5], we have developed a new 
authentication protocol that allows remote mutual 
authentication with key agreement. Our new protocol is based 
on biometric verification and ID-based Cryptograph. 
However, it is not secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. 
The new protocol needs modifications to initiate secure 
authentication between the client and server. 
The modified version of the proposed protocol should 
improve security and provide users with better authentication 
and data confidentiality. To address and correct the perceived 
security weakness in the proposed protocol, authenticating the 
ciphertext by applying encrypt-then-authenticate mechanism 
is considered to be one of the secure methods for security 
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protocols. The previous message exchange in the proposed 
protocol was constructed like this: 
Encrypt (Message || MAC) 
The new modification for the message exchange will be 
constructed as this [7,8]: 
Encrypt (Message) || MAC 
This way the MAC is covering the entire ciphertext to 
preserve the integrity of the cipher message. The MAC value 
is then appended to the encrypted message. When the recipient 
receives the authenticated encrypted message, the MAC 
should be evaluated before attempting to decrypt the 
ciphertext. If the MAC verification fails, the recipient will 
terminate the session immediately. This process will be 
efficient by eliminating the time spent to going through the 
manipulated data. The enhancements for the proposed 
protocol will only affect part of the registration phase and the 
authentication and key agreement phase. Additionally, 
enclosing the identity of the server along with the client’s 
identity can mitigate the impact of masquerading attack. The 
ID’s of entities must be unique in the network. Thus, the 
entities that wish to communicate are aware of each other. The 
modified protocol is summarised in Fig. 1. Based on the 
investigation above, we need to modify the state machine 
described in [5,6] according to the new enhancements. 
IV. PROTOCOL MODEL AND STATE MACHINE 
The EFSM is used to model the communication channel of 
the proposed protocol between the Client Ci and the Server Si. 
Since the exchange of packets follows a pattern defined by a 
finite set of rules, each principal in the protocol has a 
corresponding state machine: EFSMserver, EFSMregister and 
EFSMclient. 
A. Verifier EFSM 
The EFSMverifier is an embedded machine within 
EFSMclient and EFSMserver where states themselves can have 
other machines. To be precise, it is a set of sub-states that are 
integrated as a nested finite state machine which are inside the 
states S5 and S6 in EFSMserver and state C6 in the EFSMclient .It 
is only activated when the authentication and key agreement 
have started. The FSMverifier is triggered when it obtains 
authentication information from FSMclient or FSMserver. It 
represents various transitions during the authentication and 
validation process. This machine is modelled using 5 states 
and 8 transitions. Table 1 describes the transitions 
specifications and Fig.2 illustrates the verifier modelled by 
EFSM. 
 State V0: this state accepts the authentication 
information that needs to be verified and sends an 
authenticity-checking request to V1. 
 State V1: the EFSMverifier verifies the integrity of the 
received cipher message by recalculating the MAC 
value of the received message and comparing it with 
the attached MAC value. If the MAC values appeared 
to be identical, the machine triggers itself to the next 
state, V2, since the condition is fulfilled. However, if 
the comparison shows a different result, this would 
trigger to invalid state that then leads to termination.     
 State V2:  while in this state, EFSMverifier decrypts 
the ciphertext since MAC integrity check has been 
successful. After decryption is successful, the 
EFSMverifier transitions to the state V3. 
 State V3: the EFSMverifier checks the freshness of T via 
   – TC
i
 ≤ ∆ . If the freshness is valid, the EFSMverifier 
triggers itself to the next state. Otherwise, it produces 
invalid input if the freshness of    – TC
i
 ≥ ∆  and 
changes to state V0. 
 State V4: while in state V4, the EFSMverifier checks the 
validity of ID and based on the result it changes to state 
V0 either with event of valid ID or invalid ID. 
TABLE I.  THE TRANSITIONS SPECIFICATION OF THE VERIFIER EFSM 
Fig. 2. The verifier machine modelled by EFSM 
B. Server EFSM 
The FSM at the server side represents the various on-going 
communications with the client at any point in time. It is 
modelled using 10 states and 24 transitions and one nested 
EFSM as detailed below. Table 2 describes the transitions 
Transition 
Transition 
Direction 
Guards/Condition 
Validate 
C5  V0 
S5  V0 
S6  V0 
 
Authenticity check V0  V1  
Invalid V1  V0 Client_MAC != Server_MAC 
Integrity checked V1  V2 Client_MAC== Server_MAC 
Decrypted the 
ciphertext 
V2  V3  
Freshness checked V3  V4 T  – TC
i
 ≤ ∆T 
Invalid  V3  V0 T  – TC
i
 > ∆T 
ID valid V4  V0  
ID invalid V4  V0 Invalid ID 
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specifications Fig. 3 shows the transitions diagram for the 
EFSMserver. 
1) The EFSMserver will loop continuously while the server 
is waiting for clients. The machine advances to the next state 
once it is triggered by a login/enrol transition. 
2) When the EFSMserver is in the state S1, it checks the 
validity of the received ID. If ID is proved to be incorrect, Si 
will request Ci to enter the valid ID for three times and 
EFSMserver will loop until Ci enters the valid ID up to three 
times. In the latter case, the Ci’s account will be blocked and 
EFSMserver will change to state S4 from state S1. Generally, 
three attempts are made through our protocol steps to allow 
common errors. 
3) When the EFSMserver is in the state S2, it is triggered by 
a valid ID and it is now waiting for a valid PW. Once Si 
receives PW, it verifies the validity of PW. If PW is proved to 
be invalid, Si will request Ci to enter the valid PW for three 
times and EFSMserver will loop until Ci enters the valid PW or 
if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter case, the Ci’s 
account will be blocked and EFSMserver changes state to S4 
from state S2. 
TABLE II.  THE TRANSITIONS SPECIFICATION OF THE SERVER-SIDE EFSM 
Fig. 3. The server machine modelled by EFSM 
4) When the EFSMserver is in the state S3, it is triggered by 
a valid PW and it is now waiting for a valid Bio. Once Si 
receives Bio, it verifies the validity of Bio by comparing the 
imprinted Bio with the template stored. If Bio does not match 
the stored template, Si will request Ci to enter the valid Bio up 
to three times and the EFSMserver will loop until Ci enters the 
valid Bio or if the attempts exceed three times. In the latter 
case, the Ci’s account will be blocked and the EFSMserver 
changes state to S4 from state S3. 
5) In state S5, the EFSMserver waits until it receives the 
login request SYN = A1 = C1 || mac1 from the FSMclient to 
establish a connection by performing three-way handshake.  
6) While in state S5, the EFSMserver activates the nested 
EFSMverifier and waits for the validation check result. 
7) Once the validation has proved to be true. Si generates 
a random number and timestamp, then Si replies with 
authenticated SYN/ACK = A2 = C2 || mac2 to the EFSMclient, 
which is a combination of C2 = Enc {IDC
i
, IDS
i
, TS
i
, W2, M6, 
M7}a and Mac2 = MACk (IDC
i
, IDS
i
, TS
i
, W2, M6, M7).  
8) In state S6, EFSMserver waits until it receives ACK from 
the EFSMclient. Once the authenticated ACK = A3 = C3 || mac3 
Transition 
Transition 
Direction 
Guards/Condition 
Waiting for clients S0  S0  
Request to enrol S0  R0 ClientEnrol == True 
Client is registered  
S0  S1 
R0S0 
ClientReg == True 
Enter ID S0  S1 ID Valid 
Enter Password S1  S2 Password Valid 
Submit Biometric S2  S3 Biometric Valid 
Request client login  
(SYN received) 
S3  S5  
Re-enter ID/Password/ 
Biometric 
S2S2 
 
S3S3 
 
S4S4 
ID_attempt < 3, ID_attempt = 
ID_attempt +1 
 
PW_attempt < 3, PW_attempt = 
PW_attempt +1 
 
Bio_Attempt == < 3, Bio_attempt 
= Bio_attempt +1 
Invalid 
ID/Password/Biometric 
S2S4 
S3S4 
S4S4 
S5S4 
S6S4 
ID_attempt == 3 
PW_attempt == 3 
Bio_Attempt == 3 
Invalid ID 
Send SYN/ACK and 
C2 
S5S6 Validation check is valid 
Client ACK and C3 
received 
S6S7 Validation check is valid 
Terminate  
S5S8 
S6S8 
 
Timeout 
S1 S0 
S2S0 
S3S0 
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is received, the EFSMserver activates the nested EFSMverifier and 
waits for the validation check result.  
9) Once the validation check is proved to be true, the 
EFSMserver verifies M9≟H4 (M6 || rS
i
). At this point, Si 
authenticates Ci as a legitimate user.  
10) At state S5 and state S6, EFSMserver terminates the 
current session if any of the following situations occurs: 
 The client ID is invalid 
 The freshness of T  – TC
i
 ≥ ∆T 
 A negative result when checking the integrity of mac1 
and mac3 
 M2 !=  (x + H1(IDC
i
)
-1
. W1 
 M9 != H4 (M6 || rS
i
) 
At any stage of EFSMserver activity, EFSMserver aborts the 
current session and changes to state S9 if the timeout exceeds 
the defined TIME_WAIT while waiting for packets. This 
feature helps to prevent an infinite  wait when the EFSMclient 
fails to respond. 
C. Client EFSM 
The EFSM at the client side represents the various on-
going transmissions with the server at any point in time. It is 
modelled using 9 states, 22 transitions, and one nested EFSM 
as detailed below. Fig. 4 shows the transition diagram for the 
EFSMclient and Table 3 describes the transitions specifications. 
Fig. 4. The client machine is modelled by EFSM 
TABLE III.   THE TRANSITIONS SPECIFICATION OF THE CLIENT-SIDE EFSM 
1) First, the EFSMclient is in the initial state C0. That is 
when the request for register/login is initiated by itself. While 
in state C0, the EFSMserver checks whether Ci is enrolled or 
not. The next state will be determined according to the 
condition ClientReg == True. 
2) In state C1, C2, C3, the FSMclient is waiting for 
validating ID, PW, and Bio. Once the client credentials are 
validated, the EFSMclient triggers itself and changes to state 
C5. 
3) In states C1, C2, C3, the client may be required to re-
enter ID, PW, Bio in cases where they were incorrect. 
However, the client’s account will be blocked if the number of 
attempts exceeds three, which changes the above states to 
state C4. 
 ID_attempt < 3, ID_attempt = ID_attempt +1 
 PW_attempt < 3, PW_attempt = PW_attempt +1 
 Bio_Attempt  < 3, Bio_attempt = Bio_attempt +1 
4) In state C5, The EFSMclient generates a random number 
and a timestamp to calculate the encrypted login request 
{IDC
i
, IDS
i
, TC
i
, W1, M2, M3}a and then computes  mac1 = 
MACk (IDC
i
, IDS
i
, TC
i
, W1, M2, M3). It sends A1 = C1 || mac1 to 
the EFSMserver. This request represents the SYN part in the 
three-way handshake procedure.  
  
Transition 
Transition 
Direction 
Guards/Condition 
Request to enrol C0  R0 ClientEnrol == True 
Client is registered / 
Enter ID 
C0  C1 ClientReg == True 
Enter Password C1  C2 ID valid 
Submit Biometric C2  C3 Password valid 
Send login request 
SYN (C1) 
C3  C5 Biometric valid 
Re-enter ID/Password/ 
Biometric 
C1C1 
 
 
C2C2 
 
 
C3C3 
 
ID_attempt < 6, ID_attempt 
= ID_attempt +1 
 
PW_attempt < 3, 
PW_attempt = PW_attempt 
+1 
 
Bio_Attempt  < 3, 
Bio_attempt = Bio_attempt 
+1 
Invalid 
ID/Password/Biometri
c 
C1C4 
C2C4 
C3C4 
ID_attempt == 6 
PW_attempt == 3 
Bio_Attempt == 3 
Client receives 
SYN/ACK (C2)  
C5C6  
Client sends ACK 
(C3) 
C6C7 Validation check is valid 
Authenticated by 
server 
C7C8  
Terminate  
C5C8 
C6C8 
 
Timeout 
C1C0 
C2C0 
C3C0 
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5) While in state C5, the FSMclient is waiting for the 
EFSMserver to respond after sending the login request to 
establish the connection. Once the authenticated SYN/ACK = 
A2 = C2 || mac2 is received, the FSMclient changes to state C6. 
6) In state C6, The EFSMclient activates the nested 
EFSMverifier and waits for the validation check result. Once the 
validation check is proved to be true, the EFSMclient is 
validating the EFSMserver response M7 ≟ H4 (M4 || rC
i
). If Si is 
proved to be honest, Ci authenticates Si at this stage. 
7) While in state C6, the EFSMclient computes the shared 
session key sk = H3(IDC
i
, TC
i
, TS
i
, W1, W2, KC
i
) and finalises 
the handshake procedure by sending  authenticated encrypted 
ACK = A3 = C3 || mac3 to Si, which is a combination of  C3 = 
Enc{IDC
i
, IDS
i
, TC
i
, M9,}a  and Mac3 = MACk (IDC
i
, IDS
i
, TC
i
, 
M9).  
8) In state C7, the EFSMclient is waiting to be 
authenticated by Si.  
9) In state C8, the client terminates the current session if 
one of the following occurs: 
 Negative result when checking the integrity of mac2 
 T  – TS
i
 ≥ ∆T 
 The server ID is invalid 
 M7 ≠ H4 (M4 || rC
i
) 
D. Register EFSM 
The EFSM at the registration side represents the various on-
going transmissions with the server and client at any point in 
time. It is modelled using EFSM with 4 states and 7 
transitions. Fig. 5 shows the states and transitions diagram for 
the EFSMregister. 
1) First, the EFSMregister is triggered if the client is not 
enrolled at state R0. That is when the request for registration 
is initiated by EFSMclient. While in state C0, the EFSMserver 
checks whether Ci is enrolled or not. 
2) Once Ci enters ID, EFSMregister changes to state R1 and 
validates the format of ID. Then EFSMregister triggers itself 
asking Ci to enter PW and changes to state R2. 
3) In state R2, on receiving PW for the first time, 
EFSMregister requires Ci to re-enter PW for confirmation. Then 
it triggers itself and changes to the state R3. 
4) In state R3, Ci is required to submit multiple scans of 
the biometric data to increase accuracy. Once the acquisition 
process is complete, EFSMregister triggers itself and sends a 
message to EFSMregister, which indicates that the enrolment is 
successful. 
Fig. 5. The client machine is modelled by EFSM 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
The capability to detect errors and vulnerability is 
substantial in protocol design implementation. Since 
communication protocols are partially specified, the finite 
state approach provides a flexible way to handle invalid inputs 
and ambiguous specifications, which are usually unspecified 
or vague in protocol design. Testing the proposed protocol 
with FSM helps to verify whether the protocol complies with 
its specification or not. Modelling with FSM shows that the 
proposed protocol can function correctly and behave properly 
even with invalid input or time delay. 
The state machine in Fig. 6 represents the result of 
combing the three machines together. The composite model 
executes efficiently and handles errors in a safe way and it 
performs certain actions in case of unreliable state. Each valid 
and reachable state generates a valid protocol state and the 
transitions can be triggered by either events or guards. Based 
on the equivalent behaviour, each machine may follow 
nondeterministic behaviour and produce different outputs 
according to the original input. For example, if EFSMclient 
generates an illogical input for the authentication process then 
EFSMclient rejects the session and goes to the terminate state. 
Predicating and considering all possible combinations of both 
desirable and undesirable states are one mean to fully 
understand the complexity of the proposed protocol. 
Note that the states S9 and C9 are defined in terms of a 
timeout being reached with an inability to complete the mutual 
authentication.   
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The states S4 and C4 are defined in terms of an invalid 
input being injected due to invalid ID, wrong password, or 
unmatched biometric. The states S8 and C8 are defined in the 
case of unreliable actions being performed for example, if the 
integrity or validity check failed. Furthermore, a state machine 
hierarchy or hierarchical FSM is used to provide a more 
concrete level of refinement; FSMregister can be refined by 
introducing an “Enrol” feature. This state determines if the 
client is pre-enrolled or not. The state R0 becomes a new 
EFSM with three states R1, R2, R3 as described previously. 
Fig. 6. The modified protocol modelled by EFSM 
Based on the parallel behaviour, each machine goes 
through stages until it reaches the final state. For example, 
after successful authorisation, the EFSMclient switches to the 
authorised state and proceeds to reach the next state, which is 
authentication. This comprehensive analysis distinguishes 
three types of errors that can be detected the protocol run: 
 Type I: Timeout errors 
This error occurs when the waiting time exceeds the 
predefined time interval or it occurs when the freshness check 
exceeds ∆T. 
 Type II: Invalid errors 
This error is generated in case of invalid inputs, for 
example, invalid ID, invalid password, or invalid biometric. 
 Type III: Terminate error 
This error detects if something suspicious occurs in cases 
where the values did not match. A typical example of this 
error can be found in the integrity check, when the 
recomputed MAC value does not match the received MAC 
value. Another example is when there is a discrepancy in the 
results of the following equations: 
 M2 ≠  (x + H1(IDCi)
-1
. W1  
 M7 ≠ H4 (M3 || rC
i
) 
 M9 ≠ H4 (M6 || rS
i
) 
This error can pose serious threat because it would occur if 
the data has been modified or injected. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper started by giving a brief definition of extended 
finite state machines (EFSM). Then it elaborates the details of 
the finite-state verification of the modified protocol and 
identifies the functionality of each phase. Also, it studies the 
behaviour of each machine created for each phase and how 
they interrelate. 
The composite model executes efficiently and handles 
error in a safe way according to their types. The modified 
protocol connection progresses from one state to another 
based on the data pertained from the message exchanged. 
EFSM helps to understand the behaviour of the protocol and 
logs any unwanted behaviours.  This mechanism is very useful 
for determining the types of errors the protocol experiences 
during running and it can be useful to later on investigate what 
causes these errors and learn from them. 
In future, an in-depth security analysis and evaluation will 
be conducted via Petri Net (PN). PN will be used to simulate 
the communication patterns between the server and the client 
as well as to validate the protocol functionality. First, we will 
model the protocol without an intruder. Then, we will add the 
intruder to the model and implement a token-passing scheme. 
At this stage, we will test different attacks, such as 
impersonation attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and replay 
attack against the modified protocol and verify the security 
requirements. After analysis with PN, we will do a 
comparison between the previous protocol [5] and the 
modified version of it. 
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